HET MEEST RECENTE NUMMER VAN F&P,sept/dec 2022:FILOSOFIE & PRAKTIJK, 43 (2022) 3+4, THEMA:African Philosophy and Interculturality
De inleiding op het feitelijke thema van deze speciale uitgave van Filosofie & Praktijk, volgt hierna in “Introductory: African philosophy and interculturality”. Naast de leden van de themaredactie – Birgit Boogaard, Michael Eze en Cees Maris – wordt aan het nummer verder meegewerkt door, in alfabetische volgorde: Yonas B. Abebe, Joseph C. A. Agbakoba, Anthony Chinaemerem Ajah, Henk Haenen, Wilfred Lajul, Stephen Nkansah Morgan, Pius Mosima, Louise F. Müller, Beatrice Okyere-Manu, Angela Roothaan, Vitalis Chukwuemeka Ugwu, Meera Venkatachalam. Korte informatie over de auteurs is aan het slot van dit nummer bijeen gebracht in “About the authors”. The introduction to the actual topic of this special issue of Philosophy & Practice, will subsequently be provided in “Introductory: African philosophy and interculturality”. Apart from the theme editors – Birgit Boogaard, Michael Eze and Cees Maris – contributors to the issue are, in alphabetical order: Yonas B. Abebe, Joseph C. A. Agbakoba, Anthony Chinaemerem Ajah, Henk Haenen, Wilfred Lajul, Stephen Nkansah Morgan, Pius Mosima, Louise F. Müller, Beatrice Okyere-Manu, Angela Roothaan, Vitalis Chukwuemeka Ugwu, Meera Venkatachalam. Some brief information about the authors is collected at the end of the issue in “About the authors”. Rest mij wat deze ‘special’ betreft nog erop te wijzen dat dit een dubbelnummer betreft, de nrs. 3 en 4 van deze 43e jaargang van F&P én dat een groot deel van de bijdragen niet in het Nederlands maar in het Engels worden aangeboden. Voor F&P tot op heden ongebruikelijk, maar in dit geval alleszins redelijk. Voor het overige verwijs ik graag naar de inleiding door de themaredactie. Maar behalve dit speciale dubbelnummer, staat er nog iets bijzonders op het programma. Met ingang van de komende jaargang gaat de uitgave van F&P verzorgd worden door Amsterdam University Press (AUP). Daar zijn een aantal redenen voor, maar die liggen niet in het contact met de huidige uitgever, Garant, te Antwerpen. Dat contact is altijd prima geweest. De belangrijkste reden en het belangrijkste voordeel voor F&P is dat AUP een wetenschappelijke uitgeverij is met contact met de VSNU (Vereniging van Samenwerkende Nederlandse Universiteiten) en met de diverse Nederlandse universiteitsbibliotheken. De ‘vindbaarheid’, zeker ook digitaal, van de bijdragen aan F&P zal daarmee belangrijk vergroot gaan worden. Dat AUP gevestigd is in Amsterdam is voor de redactie nog een bijkomend voordeel. In deze ‘special’ ontbreken deze keer de traditionele rubrieken “Minima Philosophica” en “Signalementen”.
=====================================
Introductory: African philosophy and interculturality Over the past few years, African philosophy is a subject of growing interest in academic programs in the Netherlands and beyond. In this line, the Dutch philosophical journal Philosophy & Practice (Filosofie & Praktijk) publishes this special issue on African philosophy and interculturality. The theme of interculturality has gained currency in contemporary philosophy as a way of responding to the exclusivity of knowledge production in the past but also as a way of opening new vistas of knowledge that is inclusive.
Intercultural philosophy Intercultural philosophy is often evocative as an oxymoron, especially considering that every knowledge or philosophical practice is cumulative of ideas that are drawn from divergent epistemic considerations. Since the knowledge we produce or culture we possess are very rarely ours as organic seed, but rather crystallized within epistemic boundaries of cross-cultural shared experiences. For this edition, we are particularly inspired by the work of Heinz Kimmerle’s pioneering work on intercultural philosophy that offers critical perspectives for dialogue and interculturality (e.g. Kimmerle 1995, 2004, 2011, 2015, 2016).[1] Departing from the idea that every philosophy, despite its cultural blueprint, requires ontological regeneration, intercultural becomes a key prerequisite for philosophy. cultures are not self-sufficient, and every culture undergoes critical self-assessment in response to evolving questions within societies. In fact, to avoid ontological crises, cultures emerge within the fluid adaptation of pedagogical narratives. This is the context in which interculturality becomes an epistemic response to infuse fresh ideas and practices into cultural patterns and new ways of thought. It seems then that to speak of interculturality is literally an oxymoron since cultures are necessarily by definition intercultural. Interculturality is both a system of dialogue and a ‘hermeneutic mandate’ as a contributor indicates below. Following Kimmerle, an important assumption is that philosophy belongs to the human condition, meaning that philosophy exists in all cultures of the world (Kimmerle 2016). This means that “the philosophies of all cultures are of the same status and that they can communicate with each other on the same level” (Kimmerle 2016, p. 115). As such, Kimmerle was not preoccupied with questions about the existence of African philosophy, but engaged in dialogues with African philosophers. Thus, Kimmerle was one of the few Western philosophers of his time who treated African philosophy with respect and saw it as an equal partner in dialogue. Being conscious of his positionality as a European, he maintained very careful, albeit modest position towards his African colleagues. Writing in his now classic, Mazungumzo: Dialogen tussen Afrikaanse en Westerse filosofieën (Mazungumzo: Dialogues between African and Western philosophies), Kimmerle notes: As a European who has worked on African philosophy for a number of years, I cannot and do not want to explain what African philosophy is or what its essential and substantial subjects are. If one can say this at all, it should be formulated by Africans. As I wrote in my first book on this topic, my approach can be understood as ‘dialogical from the outset’. That is to say: When I address certain topics and problems of African philosophy, I can only communicate what becomes accessible to me (1) by asking certain questions, and (2) by starting from a certain way of thinking formed in a Western tradition. It is not only a question of proceeding with the greatest caution, but also of patience. First of all, it is about listening to what is to be heard, from the questions asked and the supposed way of thinking. Summarized in one expression, dialogue is about the primacy of listening. (Kimmerle 1995, p. 30, transl. Birgit Boogaard) Kimmerle thus listened to the other before speaking for himself, which is one of the five key aspects he identified for intercultural dialogues, including: (1) the methodology of listening, (2) equality and difference, (3) openness with regard to expected results, (4) other than discursive-linguistic means of understanding, and (5) specific knowledge increase (Kimmerle 2004, 2012). An important assumption herein is that persons who are engaged in a dialogue “have something to tell to each other, which none of them could have told him-/herself” (Kimmerle 2004, p. 76). From the above, it may be clear that for Kimmerle, a key condition for intercultural dialogue is mutual respect and recognition of the other within their epistemic positionalities. Kimmerle did this as early as the 1990s, which made him a pioneer and ahead of his time. While Kimmerle passed away in 2016, his work continues to be highly relevant for us today. As Pius Mosima wrote in an ‘in memoriam’ (2016): “As intercultural philosopher, Kimmerle kept a critical distance from racist conclusions about Africa. Instead, he explored a new dimension of philosophy with special focus on intercultural dialogue, which invites us to go beyond our biases and stereotypes in different cultural contexts” (Mosima 2016, p. 163). In doing so, Kimmerle seems to be anticipating the decolonial movement, suggesting that intercultural philosophy is not just a practice of dialogue but a philosophical method that transcends epistemic hierarchies. Precisely because epistemic and subjective hierarchies often constitute hindrance in knowledge exchanges, intercultural philosophy takes as its point of departure the following hermeneutic disposition: listening, equality and difference, epistemic empathy, respect, and ontological presence. According to Kimmerle (2015, p.7) “philosophy in today's world will be intercultural or it will be nothing more than an academic activity without social relevance”. Therefore, in this special edition, we try to continue the quest for dialogue through interculturality. The aim of this special issue is to stimulate philosophical dialogues about interculturality with special attention to African philosophy. However, as a traditional Dutch academic magazine, Philosophy and Practice usually publishes essays by Dutch philosophers. This special issue includes contributions of both Dutch and African scholars in this context of intercultural epistemologies. This also means that this special issue is a bilingual edition, in which articles have been published in English or Dutch. This means that authors of this special issue indicated in which language they preferred to submit the article (English or Dutch). A bilingual edition is an important way to make philosophy more inclusive: for example, earlier publications in intercultural philosophy published both English and French articles (e.g. Souleymane Bachir Diagne & Heinz Kimmerle 1998). While a bilingual edition is in line with an intercultural philosophical approach, its limitation in this special issue should be recognized: this special issue did not include abstracts or articles in other languages than English or Dutch, which means that several authors have not been able to write their contribution in their mother tongue. For purposes of coherence, the contributions have been organized in a thematic format to enunciate an intellectual trajectory that espouses an amalgam of normative, descriptive, and even socio-historical dimensions.
African philosophy and interculturality African philosophy is often described as systematic reflection on the African experience of reality. As Pius Mosima points out in the opening essay, academic African philosophy in itself springs from intercultural dialogue. Historically, this dialogue was far from the ideal of an open exchange of ideas on an equal footing of Intercultural Philosophy: it was a reaction to colonial hegemony in which the Western perspective was considered superior. This misplaced sense of superiority still exerts a profound influence in today's post-colonial era. Consequently, as a first step African philosophers had to recapture their authentic perspective. Mosima and most of the other African contributors to this volume argue for a next step: after the emancipatory process of identity recovery, African philosophy should focus on dialogue with the philosophical perspectives of other cultures, but now on an equal footing. After all, practicing philosophy is a universal human capacity. Proper understanding of this turn towards interculturality presupposes some familiarity with the African perspective as far as relevant in this context. African philosophers initially concentrated on the articulation of the pre-colonial African worldview and way of life. This is elaborated in an exemplary way by Mogobe Ramose (1999) in the fields the ontology, ethics and epistemology. According to African ontology, we live in a floating world of vital forces that dance along to the cadence of a rhythmic harmony of the spheres – a dynamic universe that cannot be captured in fixed analytical concepts. The African world view has no separation between subject and object, body and mind, ratio and emotion, or thinking and acting (but it does differentiate those). The conception of reality as a flow that cannot be captured in general concepts is familiar in Western philosophy from the contrast between Parmenides and Heraclitus: in such a flux, the logical principle of identity does not apply, as nothing preserves its identity. Accordingly, Ramose condemns attempts to construct a fixed conceptual order as “the logic of linguistic violence” that breaks the cosmic wholeness by fragmenting the flow (Ramose 2017, p. 82). Ramose develops this holistic African philosophy from the Bantu concept of ubuntu. He presents this concept as a compound of ubu, or being-in-progress, and ntu, or the concrete manifestations of this process in the form of particular beings. A particularization of this is umu-ntu: humanity manifested in concrete people. In the holistic African view, as a human being one has the task of living up to one’s potential as a member of humanity by developing compassionate relationships with others. This search for an authentic African identity is not uncontroversial. Critics doubt the assumption that the plurality of life forms and worldviews in sub-Saharan Africa form a cultural unity. Universalists like Houtjondi (2004) reject the search for a distinct African philosophy as ‘ethnophilosophy’ that inventories cultural traditions instead of subjecting them to critical philosophical analysis.[2] According to Appiah (1992), the traditional authority of African beliefs says little about their validity. Wiredu (1980) criticizes African traditions for being substantially authoritarian.[3] Within the group of African philosophers who do share the assumption of a common African identity and philosophy, there is disagreement over its further interpretation. A fundamental disagreement concerns the extent to which ubuntu ethics should revert to pre-colonial traditions or adapt to modern social realities in a globalized world.[4] But on a general level most agree that communalism and ubuntu play a central role as hallmarks of an authentic African ethic of solidarity. This is usually contrasted with Western individualism: the Cartesian I think, therefore I am is to be replaced by the African we think. In this context, ubuntu can be summarized as humaneness in the light of universal harmony. This ideal is often explained by the Bantu saying umuntu ngumuntu nga bantu: a person depends on others to be a person. In the paraphrase of Ramose: to be human is to affirm one's humanity by acknowledging the humanity of others, and on that basis to enter human relationships with others. Ubuntu in a moral sense, then, is the process by which one becomes an ethical human being by promoting the cosmic balance in just and caring dependency relationships (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013, with reference to Mkhize 2008, and Karenga 2004).[5] African communalism is defined as “the doctrine that the group constitutes the main focus of the lives of the individual members of that group, and that the extent of the individual’s involvement in the interests, aspirations, and welfare of the group is the measure of that individual’s worth. This philosophy is given institutional expression in the social structures of African society.” (Gyekye 1987, p. 208) In their contribution to this issue, Okyere-Manu and Nkansah Morgan add to this that African communitarianism rests on indigenous ethical principles such as solidarity, humanism, brotherliness and ubuntu, which are all aimed at human wellbeing, social cohesion and concern for others. The various contributions by African and Dutch scholars approach the central theme African philosophy and interculturality from a range of complementary perspectives. After Mosima’s plea for a turn of African philosophy to interculturality, Joseph Agbakoba and Anthony Ajah discuss the epistemological conditions of intercultural dialogue. Agbakoba advocates a basic epistemological universalism: universal truth criteria such as correspondence and coherence constitute an indispensable basis for intercultural exchange of knowledge. Thus, cultural fusion can result in heterosis: a form of life that is richer than its constituent cultures, providing a creative basis for plurality and freedom of choice. Ajah, too, argues against African ethnophilosophy that intercultural philosophy presupposes a level of universal epistemological unity that transcends cultural contexts. Cultural universals are likely to emerge because all people face similar existential problems, which explains how philosophers from different cultures are able to exchange ideas. Likewise, Michael Eze rejects epistemic and ontological ‘absolutism’ that starts from a dogmatic cultural perspective. Instead, he advocates intercultural dialogue based on epistemic tolerance, empathy and reconciliation. Accordingly, this plea is based on a fusion of Western perspectives (Habermas, Deleuze and Guattari, Iris Young) and African ones (Ubuntu ethics, Mudimbe). Angela Roothaan uses the hermeneutic method to explore the intercultural origin of African ethnophilosophy: the 1945 study Bantu Philosophy of the Belgian missionary Placide Tempels that provided the first systematic written inventory of African oral lore. Although criticized for its colonial background, Bantu Philosophy inspired the quest for an authentic African philosophy like ubuntu philosophy. Vitalis Ugwu’s contribution exemplifies this quest by his analysis of symbols that characterize African identity: symbols play a major role in the narratives that guide African cultural life. Ubuntu symbolizes the African communalist values. Henk Haenen highlights the traditional method of an African sage, a wise counselor with a thorough knowledge of the cultural past and present. Following African’s oral lore, the West African Koran teacher Bokar (1875-1939) propagated a philosophical and tolerant view of islamic Sufism. Wilfred Lajul analyzes the African concept of personhood. He rejects the traditional communalist conception which conceives the person as embedded in a social network, rather than as a separate and creative individual. He applauds the emergence of mixed conceptions of personhood that cherish both social care and individual autonomy. In contrast, Beatrice Okyere-Manu and Stephen Nkansah Morgan endorse communalism. Applying this ethics to human enhancement technology, they conclude that its use should be judged from the perspective of common wellbeing. African Philosophy and Interculturality concludes with two essays on African cinema. Birgit Boogaard and Yonas Abebe criticize contemporary African film culture from the critical perspective of Marcuse and Adorno: African cinema has been corrupted by the Western commercial model. Instead of decolonizing the gaze and the mind, it portrays a world that is alienated from its cultural and ethical roots. Like African philosophy, African cinema should develop its own perspective without itself falling into one-sided Afrocentrism. Louise Muller and Meera Venkatachalam, too, criticize filmmakers in Africa for using Eurocentric frameworks. They advocate the new epistemology of African Intercultural Philosophical Cinema that presents tradition and modernity as different aspects of a common reality.
African philosophy and interculturality: summariesIn African philosophy as dialogue in global times: Towards an intercultural understanding of African Philosophy, Pius Mosima observes that African philosophy as such is already a dialogue. This dialogue has a fundamentally conflictual character as it emerged from the confrontation with and resistance to violent colonial rulers. As a result, academic African philosophy has been situated in a global context from the outset. Mosima opposes the tendency in African philosophy to present itself as the philosophical articulation of a typical African identity. In the light of increasing globalization, he argues for intercultural dialogue between cultures that should lead to common humanity. In Trans-colonization, Heterosis and Intercultural Philosophy: An African Perspective, Joseph Agbakoba also emphasizes cultural hybridity. Since colonization violently interfered with the traditional African way of life, Africa has two conflicting worldviews with different epistemic orientations: the pre-colonial traditional (ratio-intuitionist) epistemic orientation and the forcibly imposed Western (ratio-scientific) epistemic orientation. The challenge is to create a new progressive African identity that is adaptive to the modern globalized world. Agbakoba advocates a creative intercultural approach that transcends the boundaries of particular cultures on the basis of mutual respect and openness. In Interculturality as Dialogical Reciprocity in African and Comparative Philosophy, Michael Onyebuchi Eze proposes epistemic humility as the barest minimum for intercultural dialogue. Upon this criterion is a demand for epistemic empathy which he built upon the recognition that our ontological commitments to knowledge production are always precarious and never too settled. He offered ways in which intercultural thus understood might yield to dialogical reciprocity and human reconciliation. The legitimating processes of interculturality he argues is not just a recognition of those of our familiar ethnicities, or that we like, but recognizing those outside our realm of experience including those we do not like. To avoid what he terms ontological absolutism, intercultural dialogue ought to transcend our dogmatic infusion of reality to include and understand the other in their strangeness and abstract difference. In Fundamental epistemological unity and possibilities of intercultural philosophy, Anthony Ajah discusses the question What conditions make intercultural philosophy possible? Ajah rejects the radical cultural-relativist view that every culture has its own incommensurable epistemological framework. Suchlike cultural essentialism arises from overcompensation in the legitimate fight against colonial epistemological injustices. Moreover, it hinders fruitful cross-cultural dialogue. Often, cultural essentialism is based on ‘bad hermeneutics’, whereby an analysis of a single local concept is generalized into a central value that would characterize the whole of Africa. Moreover, identity thinking is objectionable because it fixes a dynamic social reality based on the interaction of ever-changing agents. In the Dutch text Terug naar Bantoe Filosofie (1945). Tekst en betekenis van het werk van Placide Tempels (Back to Bantu philosophy (1945): Text and meaning of the work of Placide Temples), Angela Roothaen analyses the reception history of the book Bantu philosophy, published in 1945 by the Belgian missionary Placide Tempels on the basis of his fieldwork in the Belgian Congo. This book set the tone for African ethnophilosophy. In order to evaluate the emancipatory value of Tempels' study, Roothaan uses Gadamer's hermeneutic method: the interpreter must, from his historical perspective, interpret a text in its own context. Since 1945, Bantu philosophy has been interpreted from constantly shifting contexts; it requires an archaeological approach to analyze all these layers. Roothaan's own perspective is that of the decolonial paradigm, which distances itself from the claim of the universal validity of the Western research model and sees the former colonized as owners of knowledge of their ways of life. In The Ethics of Human Enhancement technology and African Philosophy: An intercultural Approach, Beatrice Okyere-Manu and Stephen Nkansah Morgan focus on the ethics of human enhancement by new digital technologies in the field of information, education, bioengineering, robotics and artificial intelligence. ‘Human enhancement’ is defined as improving a person’s biology and psychology in order to increase the chances of leading a good life. The authors note that this project is usually framed from the perspective of Western philosophy with its unjustified claim to universal validity, which is incompatible with the ‘interculturalines’ of contemporary societies. Intercultural philosophy requires the inclusion of ideas and knowledge from other cultures so that all parties can participate on an equal footing. Therefore, the Western view must be complemented by the African view. In A Forest of Symbols: Intercultural Identity in Contemporary Africa, Vitalis Ugwu contributes to the quest for a common African identity. This quest is problematic because of external and internal hurdles: the colonial heritage hampers cultural revitalization, while the diversity of the African peoples complicates the search for unity. Yet, historical research exposes the underlying unity of African culture as evidenced by common traits in languages, art expressions, beliefs, legends, sayings, and symbols. Ugwu’s supporting evidence is based on his analysis of symbols that characterize African identity. Indeed, symbols play a major role in the narratives that guide African cultural education and social life. In Concepts of Personhood for African Modern Living: Traditional and Modern Discussions, Wilfred Lajul analyzes the traditional and modern concepts of personhood in African philosophy. He analyzes the hybrid nature of contemporary African life. Lajul rejects the traditional communitarian concept of personhood which conceives the person as embedded in a social network, rather than as a separate individual. Lajul also rejects modern versions of the communalist ideal of the person which sees a person as a relational identity that is created through dialogue based on mutual acceptance. According to Lajul, such respectful dialogues are rare in contemporary life. Lajul does, however, signal the emergence of mixed conceptions of personhood that cherish both social care and individual autonomy. He concludes that the future belongs to new concepts of the human person, adapted to modern life in Africa. In the Dutch text Tierno Bokar pleitbezorger van verdraagzame islam Henk Haenen draws attention to the enlightened interpretation of Islam by Sufism. Haenen puts the spotlight on the plea for tolerance of the West African Koran teacher and sage Tierno Bokar (1875-1939). He contrasts this with the suppressive dogmatism of the political Islamism and the religious terror of the Islamic State and the Taliban. Bokar’s teachings can be seen as a fusion of Muslim faith and traditional African wisdom. Following African’s oral tradition, Bokar propagated a philosophical liberal view of Islam. He advocated mercy, justice and love for all human beings regardless of their faith. Islamic monotheism, indigenous animist polytheism and atheism are all entitled to respect. As Sufism teaches, all beliefs boil down to the common core message of love and mercy. In Towards an Epistemology of African Intercultural Philosophical Cinema, Louise Muller and Meera Venkatachalam, too, criticize filmmakers in Africa for using Eurocentric frameworks – although they also point to authentic African films such as Cissé’s Yeelen. Referring to African Intercultural Philosophy, they introduce the new epistemology of African Intercultural Philosophical Cinema that presents tradition and modernity as different aspects of a common reality. This intercultural approach is exemplified by the Indian film Common Threads (2018), a documentary on 19th century and current Afro-Indian textile trade that relies on good relations and mutual trust on both sides of the Indian Ocean. The film shows the intercultural dialogue between Indians and Africans: an interaction of two indigenous epistemologies that share a cyclical conception of time, by contrast to the economic time of Western capitalism. In Learning from Intercultural Philosophy: Towards Aesthetics of Liberation in Critical African Filmmaking, Birgit Boogaard and Yonas Abebe argue that African cinema should emancipate from its prevailing Eurocentricity with its claim to superiority of European values. Films thus serve as an instrument of cultural and psychological control. Boogaard’s and Abebe’s dramaturgical analyses confirm that African fiction films fail to offer a liberating perspective: instead of decolonizing the gaze and the mind, they portray a world that is alienated from its cultural and ethical roots. As an alternative, Boogaard and Abebe propose living cinema: a critical way of filmmaking based on the “aesthetics of liberation with an intercultural orientation” that results in reconnecting with African values. African living cinema requires a revolutionary African aesthetics-ethics that connects with daily life. As core principles Boogaard and Abebe mention: complementarity of individual and community, the interconnectedness of the visible and the invisible world, harmony of reason, emotion and spirits, the philosophy of difference and dialogue as a mode of doing knowledge, and the aesthetic-ethic oriented cinema as a method of self-consciousness.
References Appiah, Anthony K., In my Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Diagne, Souleymane Bachir & Heinz Kimmerle (eds), Time and Development in the Thought of sub-Saharan Africa. Studies in Intercultural Philosophy 8, Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V., 1998. Gyekye, Kwame, African Cultural Values: An Introduction. Accra: Sankofa Publishing Company, 1996. Hountondji, P., “Knowledge as a Development Issue’’. In: K. Wiredu (ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, 529-537. Kaphagawani, D.N. and J.G.Malherbe, “Epistemology and the Tradition in Africa, Introduction African Epistemology’’, In: P.H. Coetzee and A.P.J. Roux (eds), The African Philosophy Reader. New York: Routledge, 2003, 259-270. Karenga, M., Maat, the Moral Ideal in Ancient Egypt: A Study in Classical African Ethics. New York: Routledge, 2004. Kimmerle, Heinz, Mazungumzo. Dialogen tussen Afrikaanse en Westerse filosofieën. Amsterdam: Boom, 1995. Kimmerle, Heinz, “Dialogues as form of intercultural philosophy”, in: Rethinking ecumenism: Strategies for the 21st century, edited by F. L. Bakker, 63–78. Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2004. (republished in 2012 in Irian Society of Intercultural Philosophy. http://isiph.ir/en/?p=27) Kimmerle, Heinz, “Respect for the Other and the Refounding of Society: Practical Aspects of Intercultural Philosophy”, in: Intermedialities: Philosophy, Arts, Politics. Oosterling, H., and Ziarek, E.P (eds). Lexington Books, 2011, p.137-152. Kimmerle, Heinz (2015). Interculturele filosofie. Een studieboek. Antwerpen-Apeldoorn: Garant, 2015. Kimmerle, Heinz, “Hegel’s Eurocentric Concept of Philosophy”, Confluence: Journal of World Philosophies, 1 (2016) 99-117. C.W. Maris, “Filosofisch racisme en Ubuntu (1). Afrikaanse filosofie en westerse racisme’’, Filosofie & Praktijk 39 (2018) 2, 5-22. C.W. Maris, “Filosofisch racisme en Ubuntu (2)’’, Filosofie & Praktijk 39 (2018) 3, 5-20. C.W. Maris, “Philosophical racism and ubuntu: In dialogue with Mogobe Ramose’’, South African Journal of Philosophy 39 (2020) 3, 308-326, DOI: 10.1080/02580136.2020.1809124. Matolino, B., and W. Kwindingwi, “The end of Ubuntu’’. South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (2013) 2, 197–205. Doi:10.1080/02580136.2013.817637. Mkhize, N., “Ubuntu and harmony: an African approach to morality and ethics’’. In: Persons in Community: African Ethics in a Global Culture. Ed. R. Nicholson. Pietermaritzburg: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008, 35–44. Mosima, Pius, “In Memoriam: Heinz Kimmerle”. Journal of World Philosophies 1 (2016) 162 –163. Ramose, M., African Philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books, 1999. Ramose, M., Ubuntu. Stroom van het bestaan als levensfilosofie. Utrecht: Ten Have, 2017. Wiredu, Kwasi, Philosophy and an African Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Notes [1] Heinz Kimmerle (1930-2016) was Professor of Philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. In 1957, he obtained his PhD with Professor Hans-Georg Gadamar in Heidelberg on the topic of D. E. F. Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutics. From 1970 to 1976 he taught philosophy at the Ruhr-University Bochum (Germany) as a lecturer and professor of philosophy. In 1976 he was appointed professor of philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam. The last five years of his appointment (1990-1995) he held a special chair for Foundations of Intercultural Philosophy. His particular interest was on dialogues between Western and African Philosophies. He was a visiting professor at various African universities, including the University of Nairobi in Kenya, the University of Ghana in Legon/Accra, the University of Venda in South Africa and the University of South Africa in Pretoria. In 2003, the latter university (UNISA) conferred on him an honorary doctorate. He passed away at the age of 85, on the 17th of January 2016. [2] Also see Roothaan’s essay in this issue. [3] Also see Didier N. Kaphagawani and Jeanette G. Malherbe (2003). [4] See Maris (2018) and (2020). [5] Also see Eze’s essay in this issue. ---------------------------------------- |